Time is running out for Syria’s president

Syria has just seen the worst sectarian violence since the toppling of Bashar al-Assad three months ago, and perhaps since the Assad regime used chemical weapons on its people in 2013. Even a country numbed by dictatorship and civil war has been shocked. Perhaps 800 people were massacred in the western coastal areas that are the heartlands of the Alawite minority, from which the Assad family came. The violence illuminates the country’s dilemma. Should more power be concentrated in the central government, so it can keep order nationwide, despite the fact that its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is a former jihadist with only a questionable commitment to including others in his nation-building project? Or would it be better for local and ethnic factions to keep order where they can, even if that means the country risks falling apart?

Syria has just seen the worst sectarian violence since the toppling of Bashar al-Assad three months ago, and perhaps since the Assad regime used chemical weapons on its people in 2013. Even a country numbed by dictatorship and civil war has been shocked. Perhaps 800 people were massacred in the western coastal areas that are the heartlands of the Alawite minority, from which the Assad family came. The violence illuminates the country’s dilemma. Should more power be concentrated in the central government, so it can keep order nationwide, despite the fact that its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is a former jihadist with only a questionable commitment to including others in his nation-building project? Or would it be better for local and ethnic factions to keep order where they can, even if that means the country risks falling apart?

The origins of the massacres are hazy. The best guess is that fighters from the Alawite minority ambushed government forces and raided hospitals. In response, Sunni Arab militias, who support the interim government, rushed into the region in convoys, rampaging through villages and towns, killing civilians and burning homes. Videos show gunmen forcing people to bark like dogs before being shot. These Sunni militants were probably responsible for most of the killings of civilians. The sinister interpretation is that Mr Sharaa was unwilling to rein in the extremists among his supporters. The most generous is that he was slow to react and his government is not in control.

The violence in Alawite areas is one sign of Syria’s fragmentation. In the north, Kurdish groups have their own enclaves and in the south other militias, including those led by the Druze, have a sphere of influence. Outside powers are involved partly for the legitimate purpose of protecting their borders from chaos and partly because they spy a chance to control Syria’s future. Israel backs the Druze, Turkey the Sunni Arab groups, and America the Kurds. Despite its role as the strongest enforcer for the reviled Assad regime, Russia is lingering, hoping to retain some influence and perhaps access to its air and naval bases.

Mr Sharaa has so far been a disappointment. His prior experience was running an illiberal regime in the city of Idlib through his group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. So far he has run Syria like a militia boss. He has missed deadlines for forming an inclusive government, issuing a constitutional declaration and appointing a legislature. His commitment to secular laws and tolerance is sketchy. Yet his government’s shortcomings also reflect the weakness of Syria’s state. It has relatively few forces directly under its control. The army and police are outnumbered and outgunned by various ethnic militias.

Syria needs a stronger central government, yet one that uses its authority to delegate powers to the regions. The West should help by lifting economic sanctions, which were imposed to punish the previous, awful regime and are currently causing a severe cash crunch. But the onus is on Mr Sharaa. This week, after the massacres, he took some positive steps. He set up committees to investigate the sectarian violence, and signed an agreement for a large military group led by Kurds, the Syrian Democratic Forces, to integrate into the Syrian security forces.

Yet Mr Sharaa needs to do more. He must purge the army of extremists and invite more moderates to join, so that it has more muscle to restore order and is not seen as a tool of Sunni power. He must create political institutions and an electoral timetable that might reassure Syrians that a more powerful government will not be a Sunni supremacist one. He must delegate more powers to the regions. Rebuilding Syria is a confidence game: if more people believe there can be a harmonious future, the odds of getting there rise. But one more massacre under Mr Sharaa and that game could be over. 

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